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 Abstract. Making profits out of war is an ancient phenomenon. There 
are enterprises constantly supplying material to prepare armies and 
consequently profit from war. Enterprises have become aware that 
war itself and the post-war period is undoubtedly lucrative. However, 
the war also never works for any individual or group, except a 
dominant elite few: the wealth who propagate and influence patriotic 
and despotic war-peddling all over the world, making trillions of dollars 
in profit out of devastations and deaths, at the same time exciting 
their nationalism, and inspiring the citizen’s backing. The paper has 
examined Executive Outcomes (a commercial security firm) and the 
United States of America, Russia, Kenya and Uganda as countries that 
are examples of those engaging in Warpreneurship. But in the long 
run, the war in itself does not result in peace but immense profits and 
securing resources for the dominant elite few. 
Keywords: war; entrepreneurship; warpreneurship; axis of virtuous. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since militaries are legitimate, people perceive 
warfare to be tolerable and do not feel that it is 
wicked or wrong. Whether their intention is for 
defence or offence, these enormous influential 
establishments endure especially to exterminate 
people. War and large military establishments 
are the most significant sources of violence in the 
world [40]. Its very nature is solitary of disaster 
and misery. People should all be horrified by the 
extent of their disaster but instead are too con-
fused [40]. This might be because wars have 
been coated as going to bring peace and security. 
Examples of such include the majority of Saudi 
citizens’ stance regarding their military involve-
ment in Yemen, the Soviet citizen’s attitude con-
cerning their nation’s involvement in Syria, and 
the USA allies’ citizen’s position regarding their 
country’s participation in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor 
can it be spread instantaneously. Weapons and 
military have to be accumulated to wage wars. 
Therefore, the weapons businesses must adopt 
the entrepreneurial skills of willing to bear the 
risk of a new war if there is a significant chance 
for revenue [28]. Making profits out of warfare is 
a very long-standing reality as there are always 
firms supplying hardware to prepare militaries 
and consequently profit from war [28]. Conse-
quently, this paper sets out to confirm that con-
temporary wars never work for any nation, ex-
cept the weapons entrepreneurs. On the contra-
ry, they will propagate and influence patriotic 
and racial war-soliciting the whole world, making 
big dollars in profits from annihilations and de-
structions while exciting their nationalism and 
inspiring citizens’ backing. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Old Wars 
For warfare to erupt amongst sane players, nota-
bly, one of the actors associated should expect 
achievements from the skirmish outweighing the 
expenses incurred. In the absence of this qualifi-
cation, there is a surety of enduring peace [26]. 
For instance, it is possible that two nations are 
individually positive and persuaded that they 
would achieve advancement from a conflict. In 
such instances, war can flare up as long as the 
contradiction of opinions is significant enough to 
pay off war’s cost. For instance, if both states ex-
pect to triumph in a war with high enough prob-
ability, there would not be any agreement that 
avoids war [19]. 
Two examples of wars that are recognised to 
such blunders or miscalculations due to a lack of 
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data about comparative power have been dis-
cussed. In 1866, Austria supposed that it was 
mightier than Prussia, and Prussia believed it su-
perior to Austria. Each was aware of the other’s 
opinion, but they believed it was mistaken [38]. 
In this case, nationalism triumphed, and Prussia 
achieved domination over the newly ordered 
confederation of North Germany, a union of 21 
smaller German political units and Prussia [39].  
The 1st World War commenced on July 28 1914, 
and it was blamed on the divergences in policies, 
even though what ignited it was the murder of 
Austria’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand [2]. The 
warfare commenced primarily due to four as-
pects: Patriotism, Alliances, Imperialism and Mili-
tarism. In 1914, England predicted that the con-
flict would be brief as it based its point of view 
primarily on economics. Then England was the 
dominant commercial authority. For that reason, 
if the commercial breakdown were going to hit 
sooner during the war, it would first affect Ger-
many, leading to its submission [38]. In contra-
diction, the German rulers anticipated that the 
conflict would be shortened due to modernised 
armed forces innovations [38]. Germany was the 
recognised master in that field and so could ex-
pect victory. Expectations of the conclusion of the 
war had a solid and subjective line of thought. 
Nationalism and commitment to a treaty saw 
Britain enter the war [2]. These old wars were 
fought for geopolitical interests and ideologies, 
i.e., socialism or democracy.  
World War two started on September 1 1939, 
due to the Treaty of Versailles that was having a 
crippling effect on the German economy. Ger-
mans were outraged and appalled towards their 
government’s acceptance of such a treaty [13]. 
This appalling sentiment would in the future 
evolve to resentment feelings of other European 
states who drafted the treaty and of the admin-
istration that acknowledged it. This was a na-
tionalistic war for the people and the nation. 
Japan was severely affected by commercial deso-
lation, and its citizens lacked confidence in the 
state [4]. Therefore, the citizens obligated the 
military for a solution to be found for their eco-
nomic difficulties. Consequently, the Japanese 
military attacked China, a territory endowed with 
mineral deposits and other resources. This was 
to get natural resources for its factories to pro-
duce more goods that it needed. This, too, was a 
war for the people and the nation. 
As for 1950-1953, Korean War began when the 
North Communist Korean military went over the 
38th parallel and launched an attack on the South 
non-communist Korea. It has been documented 
that the Korean war had its origins from a com-
posite of an outer dispute of the USA and USSR 
policies concerning the East-Asia, and the inter-
nal struggles in the Korean peninsula [28]. This 
context expounds how the Korean peninsula war, 
although at the outset was a kind of nationalism 
conflict, ultimately established into a conflict 
amongst the East and West alliances (cold war). 
The Arab-Israeli War of October 6 1973, popular-
ly referred to as the Yom Kippur War, had its 
conception sown in Israel’s spectacular six-day 
triumph in the 1967 conflict. The Arab militaries 
endured a humbling loss, which the Egyptian 
President Nasser felt the most [10]. President 
Anwar Sadat, who succeeded President Nasser, 
had a clear diplomatic objective, land for peace, 
translated into a limited military mission. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had a 
clear political objective as Moscow could not en-
visage losing their political dominance in a 
neighbouring patron nation. It was an apprehen-
sion reinforced by the suspicions that Islamic 
fundamentalism would likely diffuse into their 
Muslim borders [12]. These are only a few ‘real’ 
wars that have been fought over nationalism ide-
ologies. Mueller, in other words, refers to them as 
‘old war’ [27]. These old wars were fought for 
geopolitical interests and ideologies.  
 
The 20th Century Global System 
But then, the international system has undergone 
a profound transformation in recent years. A 
transformation moulded by the conclusion of the 
Cold War in 1990, the globalisation phenomena 
and the development of fresh arrangements of 
collaboration and struggle amongst nations and 
non-nation players. Moreover, through the UN 
and Regional Organizations, states are in com-
munication with one another [28]. The global ar-
rangements during the 20th century were there-
fore formulated to brave the inter-state competi-
tiveness and civil skirmishes. Nonetheless, skir-
mishes and wars have not been eradicated. But 
due to the achievements in decreasing inter-state 
conflicts by the current global systems, the lefto-
ver practices of skirmishes cannot suit accurately 
within “war” [44].  
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Most of what passes as wars in the current world 
are typically symbolised by the evil and innova-
tion competition by ‘thugs’ and never in any way 
by the elemental collision of cultures [28]. Most 
of the agents give justification of ideological rhet-
oric or national ethnic to give credence to their 
actions since expressing their thrill for profit 
would be politically improper [28]. This is be-
cause, in the makeup of the 20th-century global 
system, the United Nations and its subsidiaries 
have so often been called upon to avert disputes 
from escalating into war. 
This transformation has produced the growth of 
a new kind of war that is unique from previous 
ones. Different wars were established in the last 
years of the 20th century, particularly in Eastern 
Europe and Africa [21]. These different types of 
conflicts have been designated by a concept ‘New 
Wars’. The new wars have provoked scholars to 
re-evaluate the characteristics of warfare from 
very new dimensions, of the players involved and 
their interests. The number of intrastate wars 
has diminished, whereas the frequency of inter-
state wars has heightened. Therefore, these con-
flicts are termed internal conflicts or civil wars 
[21]. From the new perspective, these civil wars 
or internal conflicts are exclusively engaged in by 
the non-state players, inspired mainly by finan-
cial gains, and that they are ruthless than the 
previous wars [25].  
Some studies have identified ethnic, religious or 
tribal identities as the most significant variable in 
analysing wars [14]. Nevertheless, scholars state 
that the association between wars and ethnic, 
religious or tribal identities is not natural and so-
cial identities are merely vital as a collation 
scheme in civil wars [11]. At the same time, some 
of them have been baptised as the war on terror.  
One of the best ways to improve and preserve 
power and funding for war is to keep the popu-
lace in constant fear by invoking ethnic, religious 
or tribal identities and, more recently, of ‘terror-
ism and terrorists’. This enables those at the top 
of the dominant elite few to easily direct their 
subjects’ thinking and, therefore, shape the world 
they control. As a result, the populace consents to 
a more significant part of taxes being spent on 




Business prospects continue being there, but 
contests are now as much about persistence as 
development. And, as worldwide contests endure 
to intensify, opportunities of the market edge are 
becoming ever more challenging to preserve 
over some duration of time. Hence it is the capa-
bility to form fresh opportunities of market lev-
erage quickly, often that will prove to be the only 
viable opportunity of real market leverage. Busi-
nesses have reacted to adjustments quickly, just 
as they have responded quickly to the activities 
of their competitors [6]. Therefore, businesses 
must adopt the entrepreneurial skills of willing 
to bear the risk of a new endeavour if there is a 
significant chance for revenue.  
An entrepreneur’s role, therefore, is to market 
their innovations. They develop new merchan-
dise or services that the market demands, and 
sometimes the market does not demand but are 
currently not being delivered. Hence, entrepre-
neurship can be defined as “an analysis of how, 
by whom and with what consequences opportu-
nities to produce future goods and services are 
discovered, evaluated and exploited” [33]. Also, 
an entrepreneur is innovative, first perceiving 
and creating new opportunities; second operat-
ing under unpredictability, as well as introducing 
merchandises for sell, deciding on the venues, 
and forming and using means/assets; and third 
managing their corporation and competing with 
the rest for a stake of the market [42]. By so do-
ing, these same corporations get to be operation-
al again: building, producing, and marketing 
again.  
Therefore, enterprises have become aware that 
war itself and the post-war period is undoubted-
ly lucrative. Weapons and security producing en-
terprises manufacture all the stockpiles of war 
that they wish to market for earnings. Therefore, 
most of it is delivered to their potential consum-
ers and the stockpiles are gotten rid of. Now 
those prospective buyers: governments and mili-
tias have their stocks full, which they paid using 
taxes or other activities like ransoms and drug 
peddling. For that reason, they have to justify the 
rationale for acquiring the battle arsenals to the 
citizens or themselves. This is through wars and 
wars that have to be sanitised by the populace 
and their supporters.  
War never works for any individual or group, but 
for only a dominant elite few: the wealthy who 
propagate and influence patriotism and ethnic 
war-peddling worldwide, making big dollars in 
earnings from devastations and death, while in-
spiring the citizen’s backing [27]. Making earn-
Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2021. Vol. 7, No 9  ISSN 2413-9009 
Section “Law and Security”   3004 
ings out of warfare is a very age-old phenome-
non, as there have been organisations delivering 
weapons to ready militaries and subsequently 
earn from wars. 
 
Warpreneurship 
The chance of a civil war occurring in developing 
countries with dependency on exporting natural 
resources is much higher than in developing 
countries that do not have natural resources or 
are not dependent on exporting this [32]. This is 
because intrastate wars are primarily fought 
over resources (even though the public is misled 
by other motives, such as the threat of ‘terrorist 
attacks, to cover up motives of securing re-
sources and making a profit). 
Executive Outcomes (EO), a commercial, military 
organisation, performed its first critical security 
expedition in Angola in 1993. The organisation 
was contracted to represent the Angolan state by 
Anthony Buckingham, a high-ranking consultant 
to numerous North American oil firms [3]. Their 
mission was to retake and secure oil reserves 
from UNITA rebels, an undertaking that EO com-
pleted with precision. The EO’s exemplary per-
formance gave rise to a $40 million deal with the 
Angolan state for training and supplying arma-
ments to the country’s military and offer security 
against UNITA [3]. Moreover, after the contract 
renewal with EO in 1994, government troops’ 
accomplishment against UNITA forced the rebels 
to sign a peace agreement with the Angolan ad-
ministration. This was a big win for the EO.  
Executive Outcomes’ success steered a group of 
British-based entrepreneurs to its control. They 
formed a conglomerate of associated military en-
terprises, for example, Ibis Air, Alpha 5, Saracen 
International, Teleservices International, Life-
guard, Bridge International, Shibata Security 
[36]. And also, resource extractions organisa-
tions, for example, Branch Energy, Heritage En-
ergy, Ranger Oil, Diamond Works [36]. The estab-
lishment of the consortium of associated military 
enterprises and resource extractions organisa-
tions had one objective for the entrepreneurs, the 
control and extraction of the oil reserves in Ango-
la. 
The article “Warrior for hire in Iraq” describes 
that the ten-leading commercial, military organi-
sations spent a further 32 million US dollars lob-
bying. They also spent an extra 12 million US dol-
lars on political campaign contributions [34]. 
Commercial, military organisations, are not only 
selling their services to countries, but they are 
also serving as security operators for aid organi-
sations [35]. There are no natural limitations for 
commercial, military organisations as to whom 
they may sell their services.  
As already mentioned earlier, the armaments 
producing organisations do not make a profit by 
the mere fact of selling their services and prod-
ucts. Selling would mainly result in stockpiling, 
and stockpiling does not give assurance to future 
trade. The weapons have to be used to fight wars, 
whereby both conflicting parties will have stock-
piled enough. If both sides are peaceful and not 
equipped yet, the wantrepreneurs will create a 
conflict and divide them. 
During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the USA gov-
ernment often insisted on neutral in the pro-
tracted war. However, the Reagan government 
discretely resolved moments after taking office in 
January 1981 to permit Israelis, bitter foes of 
Saddam Hussein, to supply numerous billion dol-
lars’ worth of USA manufactured weapons as 
well as spare parts to Iran [15]. That intervention 
and the resolve to assist Tehran aided Tehran to 
disregard initial expectations of a rapid Iraqi tri-
umph and attain significant achievements early 
in the conflict, which had commenced with an 
Iraqi assault in September 1980. 
In 1982, the Reagan Administration secretly re-
solved to hand over highly classified information 
to President Saddam Hussein. They also author-
ised the trade of USA-made weapons of war to 
assist Iraq in forestalling an impending loss in the 
conflict with Iran. The USA decision to supply 
pivotal help to Baghdad was reached after the 
USA intelligence organisations cautioned that 
Baghdad was on the brink of being overrun by 
Tehran, whose military had been reinforced the 
year earlier by clandestine cargoes of the USA-
made weapons [15]. Washington also “looked the 
other way,” as USA-made weapons were being 
flown to Iraq from Baghdad’s partners in the 
Middle East, as from 1982. Saudi Arabia and Jor-
dan shipped small guns and mortars, amongst 
other arms, to Iraq, whereas Kuwait traded thou-
sands of TOW anti-tank ammunitions with the 
Iraqis. By 1982, the Jordanian armed force was 
consistently deviating USA-made Huey helicop-
ters for Baghdad [15].  
The USA officials made no effort to stop these 
transfers, although the USA export law forbade 
the third organisation relocation of USA-made 
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weapons without the USA’s authorisation. Thus, 
the Americans were supplying both parties to see 
neither party domineer the strategic oil region. 
And by just firing these weapons and using the 
vast of other hardware, it amounted to revenues 
in unimaginable ways that helped reduce the 
USA government stock and aided in further pro-
duction by its military producing firms. 
It can be argued that the US’s presence in Afghan-
istan had as much to do with the survival of Bush 
in the 2005 general election after the 9/11 attack 
dented his image as a president who had not pro-
tected the US from a severe home attack. By at-
tacking and toppling the Taliban government, 
Bush was portraying machoism to America as the 
right man needed to finish the job of going after 
criminals everywhere and making America safe 
again. This is one of the best ways to preserve 
political power and war funding by keeping the 
citizens in continuous fright of ‘terrorists’ and 
terrorism [28]. As a result, the American citizens 
consented to a more significant part of govern-
ment revenues funding the boundless industrial-
military complex. 
The Warfare in Afghanistan commenced on Oc-
tober 7 2001, with the coalition air bombard-
ment on the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces and in-
stallations, officially launching Operation Endur-
ing Freedom. This was in response to the ‘terror-
ist’s attack on September 11, 2001, in the United 
States, killing 2,977 people, excluding the 19 hi-
jackers. The military mission was to prevent fu-
ture attacks on the Americans by the ‘terrorists’ 
relishing in a haven in Afghanistan. In the ensu-
ing 17 years, the USA has suffered around 2,400 
military causalities in Afghanistan [41]. The US 
Congress has also reserved over $132 billion 
(Cost of War Update as of March 31, 2019) in 
support of Afghanistan since 2002, with approx-
imately 63% of it for security [41]. This is gains 
from a war for the leader and their cronies and 
simply a business venture. 
Interestingly, after the CIA tracked Osama bin 
Laden to the Tora Bora cave southeast of Kabul 
on December 3 2001, the American military lei-
surely engaged to capture him, as they left the 
operation to be undertaken by a ragtag Afghan 
contingent [9]. It resulted in the eventual escape 
of bin Laden for Pakistan. Which raises the fol-
lowing questions that: Would his capture have 
led to the end of the storyline of making America 
safe again and, therefore, an end to the reasons 
for spending billions on the military in Afghani-
stan? Was the US troops less assertive role in his 
capture a strategy to ensure his escape? In mid-
2019, the American administrators were negoti-
ating directly with the Taliban’ terrorists’ on 
countering terrorism. However, it is still vague on 
what type of political arrangements can contain 
both the Taliban and the US to the level that the 
former completely forsake their armed 
war/insurgency.  
In 2003, the USA attacked Iraq under the pre-
tence that Iraq bared a security risk to America, 
as it stocked weapons of mass destruction. For 
the reason that Baghdad sponsored terrorism 
against Americans. Another pretext was to save 
Iraqi citizens from Saddam Hussein’s decade’s 
old tyranny [23]. In the aftermath of 9/11, the 
political elite was able to justify that war and ral-
ly the American citizens on what engagements to 
be involved in defeating terrorism (familiar de-
tested foe) [24]. Assuming that some topmost 
leaders in the Bush government had by then re-
solved to oust President Saddam Hussein not-
withstanding the 9/11 assault, President Bush 
would have found it difficult to garner any back-
ing from the American citizens and its partners. 
The political resolve and the factual grounds vital 
to validate the warfare were absent. Nearly all 
the military new technology built-in terms of tril-
lions of dollars since the 1980s, and intended to 
tilt any war with the Soviet Union to US ad-
vantage, had never been previously tested in a 
combat scenario. By introducing high-tech weap-
ons during the operation, it was showcasing their 
effectiveness to their customers. This meant that 
their success rate in Desert Storm had to be 
shown to be dazzling by the western media, who 
had strategically been embedded in the opera-
tion. 
Without a doubt, even before the dust of the war-
fare had settled in the gulf, arms manufacturers 
from Britain, France, United States, West Germa-
ny, and other countries were gathering in the 
Middle East to hawk their merchandise. Saudi 
Arabia, the biggest buyer, was interested in 
Apache helicopters, Abrams M1A1 tanks, AWACS 
radar planes, F-15 fighters, Patriot missiles, Brad-
ley fighting vehicles, Seahawk helicopters, and 
multiple-launch rocket systems [1]. Israel want-
ed more Patriot missiles, the M-109 artillery, ad-
vanced F-15 fighter, and portable battlefield nav-
igation systems [1]. Egypt is interested in buying 
the Hawk missiles, M-60 tank upgrades, and F-16 
fighters [1]. And the United Arab Emirates, and 
so did Bahrain and Turkey, made clear that they 
Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2021. Vol. 7, No 9  ISSN 2413-9009 
Section “Law and Security”   3006 
would like to have the Patriot missiles and 
Abrams M1A1 tanks. The only political objectives 
accomplished were the Bush administration’s 
arrogant determination to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein and prove that it could remove any gov-
ernment it disliked [20].  
And the results indicate that, for the first time 
since 2002, the five top positions in the Global 
arms industry rankings are solely held by weap-
ons organisations established in the USA: General 
Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, Lock-
heed Martin and Raytheon. These five organisa-
tions exclusively accounted for $148 billion and 
35 per cent of total Top 100 arms sales in 2018 
[37]. Total arms sales of the USA organisations 
totalled $246 billion, a corresponding of 59 per 
cent of all weapon transactions by the Top 100 
Global arms organisations. That was a 7.2 per 
cent increase compared with 2017. 
In September 2015, Russia intervened in the Syr-
ian civil war surprising its own nearest commen-
tators of Moscow’s overseas and security strate-
gy. It had persistently been held that the Russian 
armed force would not possibly be mobilised to 
involve in excursion assignments beyond Rus-
sia’s closest vicinity of the post-USSR. In Syria, 
Putin’s banking on President Assad’s administra-
tion was visibly important, but the indication that 
he would expose his military to rescue al-Assad 
appeared not a possibility. Yet, surprisingly, that 
was exactly what transpired. Therefore, it is im-
perative to answer why Putin would engage in 
such an adventure regarding this action. 
The collective weapons trades of the 10 Russian 
organisations during the 2018 grading were 
$36.2 billion, a minimal reduction of 0.4 per cent 
in 2017 [39]. This was an arms trade fall from 
9.7 per cent in 2017 to 8.6 per cent in 2018. This 
could be partly related to the considerable devel-
opment in the collective weapons sales of the 
USA and European organisations in 2018. The 
arms manufacturers in the USA and Europe were 
doing something right that the Russians had not 
been doing, and that is, they had successfully 
showcased and sold their weapons in various 
war theatres, but Russia had not. 
Commentators had predicted a heightened dan-
ger of an accidental clash between the Russian 
Aerospace Forces (VKS) and the United States 
Airforce (USAF) over a congested Syria’s airspace 
[7]. Nevertheless, Russian planners considered 
the USA presence in the Syrian theatre, and Rus-
sia was assured that the allied jets would not ag-
gressively challenge their presence. Let us make 
a quick rewind to bring everything into focus. As 
of 2003, Trump was in extremely distressed fi-
nancial difficulty, and his enterprises were col-
lapsing. In 2004, Casino Resorts and Trump Ho-
tels applied for bankruptcy with a debt of 1.8 bil-
lion dollars [16]. He couldn’t get anyone in the 
USA to bail him. That is when the Russian ‘intelli-
gence’ picked up the scent, and Trump’s bailout 
was all coming out of Russia. His association with 
Moscow is more profound than ever recognised, 
and all with Putin’s approval. Hence, Trump 
eventually made a comeback, particularly with 
investment by affluent citizens of Russia and the 
former USSR republics. The Russian intervention 
in the Syrian civil war was likely an invite of an 
ally to undertake some warpreneurship. There-
fore, there was no way going to be a risk between 
Putin’s and Trump’s pawns.  
The Russian defence-industrial complex (DIC) 
represents a large share of Russian’s GDP as a 
whole. Moscow’s military corporation comprises 
approximately 1,500 enterprises comprising re-
search institutions, design bureaus, and produc-
tion complexes acquired from the former USSR. 
As of 2014, the DIC comprised 1,339 organisa-
tions, engaging 1.3 million persons. The overall 
expenditure on security hardware and research 
and development amounted to approximately 
$45.4 billion, or 3.4% of Russian GDP [4]. With 
the increasing contest in the weapons market 
and the development of new actors, Russian’s 
main interest is to safeguard its current prevail-
ing place. In part, the market launch of fresh in-
novations of weapons in Syria means that Krem-
lin can count on it. So, the Syrian conflict was 
used as a live-fire testing range for a new genera-
tion of Russian weapons and operational tech-
niques. This was made evident by systematic de-
ployments of every type of combat aircraft in the 
Russian catalogue, including modern Russian at-
tack helicopters Ka-52s, Mi-35Ms, Mi-28Ns, and 
Su-25SM, Su-24 Su-27, Su-34s, S-300VMD and S-
400 anti-air missile systems, strategic bombers 
that had previously at no time been able to fire a 
weapon in a war scenario. 
The conflict in Syria has had an excellent reper-
cussion on the Russian weapons industry. The 
conflict has worked as a testbed and as an audi-
tion for new Kremlin military accessories. As a 
result, Russian arms wantrepreneurs have been 
able to get new equipment orders, including the 
S400 anti-aircraft missiles for Turkey, Saudi Ara-
bia and India. 
Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2021. Vol. 7, No 9  ISSN 2413-9009 
Section “Law and Security”   3007 
On October 14, 2011, the Kenya Defense Force 
(KDF) invaded Somalia. It was alleged that Al-
Shabaab was to be blamed for the decline of a 
security, the spillover of skirmishes into neigh-
bouring territories, particularly in Kenya, and the 
severe humanitarian condition persisting in sev-
eral places of Somalia [28]. However, Kenya had 
developed to be a target for ‘terrorist’ assaults 
even before the advent of Al-Shabaab. August 7 
1998, the bombing of the American Embassy in 
Nairobi with a death toll of 213 people and 4,000 
wounded [22]. Therefore, Kenya embarked on 
heavy military spending that was informed by 
the need to defend its territory against the Soma-
lia-based Al-Shabaab’ terrorists’ who had target-
ed civilians and security agencies in significant 
towns and border townships in the past.  
Surprisingly, after the KDF incursion into Soma-
lia, during 2011-2012, Kenya has been attacked 
approximately 17 times, with the usages of gre-
nades and other explosive devices. Close to 48 
people have perished in these assaults, and ap-
proximately 200 people injured [22]. The targets 
have included churches, police agents, infrastruc-
ture, bars and nightclubs, a downtown building 
of small shops, learning institutions, and a bus 
station. This points to a deteriorating security 
situation in Kenya despite its military operation 
in Somalia that was supposed to make Kenya 
even safer. Instead, it is a military operation that 
has seen the country spend immensely on mili-
tary equipment to the extent that it is alleged to 
be in an arm’s race with the neighbours [31]. It 
can be argued that the main reason for the con-
tinuing Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya is not be-
cause the Kenyan security agents are unable to 
curb them, but for some of the leaders to pre-
serve power and funding for war by keeping the 
public in perpetual fear. As a result, they can jus-
tify to the citizens the much-increased military 
financing. These new wars have nothing nation-
alism, but they are made to create good business 
for some leaders and their associates. 
As informed by the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Kenya acquired 
186 million dollars’ worth of current military 
weapons in five years between 2010-2015, in 
comparison to 8.6 million dollars’ expenses be-
tween 2005-2009 which was a 20 % increase 
during the season and the uppermost in East Af-
rica [31]. Military imports by Kenya increased 
significantly, and in 2007–11, it acquired 32 WZ 
551 APCs and 4 Z-9WA helicopters from China, 
15 second-hand F-5E combat aircraft from Jor-
dan, 35 Puma M-26 APC from South Africa valued 
at Sh1.6 billion that are immune to an explosion 
from land mines and improvised explosive de-
vices (IED) and 3 Mi-171 helicopters from Russia 
[18]. The stockpile also includes the largest ves-
sel in the Kenya Navy fleet at 43 million dollars’ 
naval ship from Spain christened KNS Jasiri [18]. 
During the 2013–17 period, it acquired two sec-
ond-hand combat helicopters, 13 transport heli-
copters, a small number of self-propelled howitz-
ers and 65 light armoured vehicles [43]. 
In addition, Kenya was diverting weapons sup-
plied by Ukraine to South Sudan, which was still 
under the European Union arms embargo. The 
deliveries and satellite images show that some T-
72 tanks were delivered to Southern Sudan via 
Kenya [17]. Despite the USA being convinced that 
arms have been diverted to Southern Sudan by 
Kenya and Ukraine, the USA did not call for in-
ternational sanctions against either country. And 
security commentators have concluded that 
Kenya was acting on the behest of the Americans. 
The USA was interested in ensuring that Ukraine 
could earn foreign exchange and increase its cof-
fers which was being depleted due to the crisis it 
was having with Russia. Once in Southern Sudan, 
war machinery was deployed to fight an enemy 
who was no longer Sudan. Hence a new enemy 
had to be created, where vice president Riek 
Machar comes into the picture. Where there is a 
lack of a definite enemy, one has to be created to 
justify the usage of the war machinery. The 
wantrepreneurs and their cronies will propagate 
and influence patriotic and racial war-soliciting 
to inspire the citizen’s backing to make big dol-
lars in profits. 
In 2017, Kenya obtained an undisclosed quantity 
of AH-1 cobra assault helicopters as the quota of 
its armed forces collaboration with Jordan [29]. 
Nairobi also obtained its closure of two Huey II 
helicopters [29]. The crafts are powered by new 
Honeywell T53-L-703 engines, qualifying them to 
have an enhanced hover performance in hot en-
vironments, reflecting KDF’s requirements in its 
Somalia operation. The Sipri report illustrates 
that, in 2017, Kenya procured a second-hand 
maritime gun, AK-630 30mm, from Montenegro 
to upgrade Jasiri OPV (offshore patrol vessel). 
This is supposed to also meant to keep Al-
Shabaab at bay from preying on the seagoing 
vessels. In February of the same year, the Kenya 
Navy obtained the closure of six metal shark pa-
trol boats [29]. Additional four were supplied 
over last year, the cost totalling $4.9 million. 
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Kenya’s armed forces expenditure in 2018 rose 
as it received several MD 530F armed light heli-
copters from US-based MD Helicopters costing 
$253 million, whose orders had been placed in 
May 2017 [29]. The order from Nairobi included 
the provision of MD 530F “cayuse warrior” light 
assault helicopters, 24 M260 rocket launcher sys-
tems, 24 HMP 400 machine gun pod systems and 
assorted ammunition [29]. Bell Helicopters is to 
deliver to Nairobi and Kampala with 13 helicop-
ters and spare parts. These neighbours intend to 
adapt to enhance their expeditions under the Af-
rican Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) com-
mand. Al-Shabaab militants are a terrorist organ-
isation whose mention gives legitimacy for the 
ruling elite to engage in warpreneurship. All this 
is good business for the warpreneurs and the 
countries’ leaders engaged in it for more than 
just their political survival and growth.  
Kampala’s rendezvous in Somalia can contend as 
the most contemporary illustration of the Muse-
veni regime’s multi-pronged ‘image manage-
ment’ approach to obtaining favourable relations 
with backers. The mission’s first troops, 1,650 
Ugandan peacekeepers, were deployed in March 
2007. In so doing, the regime has been able to 
sanctify itself in the eyes of the warpreneurs. In 
2014 and 2015, it procured arms from Romania, 
Slovakia and Bulgaria, then sent them to Juba’s 
government, breaching the European Union 
weapons embargo in 2011.  
Ammunition in two truckloads was transported 
to South Sudan from Uganda in June 2016 [29]. 
Later that same year, the South Sudan military 
obtained truckloads of small arms ammunition 
and two fighter jets. It is still a mystery how the 
two L39 jets that Kampala from Ukraine pro-
cured showed up in the Juba government, but it 
is a lesson learned and then perfected from her 
neighbour Kenya. In 2017, confidential reports 
claimed that the Uganda government had pur-
chased weapons from Russia and transferred 
them to the South Sudan military. The 40 deliv-
ery was made of 31 tons of magazines, AK-47 ri-
fles and assorted weapons.  
In September 2017, the armed force of Uganda in 
Amisom received 19 Acmat Bastion armoured 
carriers from the USA. And in February 2018, 
they also got a supply of an undetermined quan-
tity of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) for re-
connaissance, surveillance and intelligence. In 
addition, Uganda expected and received five heli-
copters from the United States in 2018 as part of 
an $87.6 million arrangement with Bell Helicop-
ters endorsed in September 2016. The arms from 
the United States manufacturers have been made 
possible due to Kampala joining the bandwagon 
of the ‘Axis of Virtuous’ (the opposite of the Axis 
of Evil) by fighting a terrorist group Al-Shabaab. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
But what is evident with the new wars is that 
they have to be given more lease of lifelike, ‘Axis 
of Virtuous’ because it is good for business. The 
‘Axis of Virtuous’ is a highly placed ruling elite 
who understand the potential of warpreneur-
ship. Gains from a war for the leader and their 
cronies would be simply a business venture. Be-
lieving we are under constant threat of the un-
seen, we become willing and dedicated sponsors 
to the financial and political ideas of the mon-
strous war industry, marketed to us under the 
guise of our security and protection. War does 
not result in peace but immense profits and se-
curing resources for the dominant elite few. 
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